likely to be able to fulfil her duty to her neighbour, if that duty is to keep in order a wide tract of country inhabited by wild tribes.
I would, therefore, suggest that it may be worth while to make a strong effort to secure the Salween-water parting (Frontier No. 1). I doubt if the Chinese Foreign Office knows or cares much about the frontier of Yunnan, which it would be inclined to regard as a local question. The previous Treaty, as a glance at the text will show, seems to have been based almost wholly on information supplied by Burma, and as the Chinese Boundary Commissioners are appointed locally, the idea seems to be that if the Provincial Government does not like the Treaty signed by the central authorities, it can give its Commissioners instructions at variance with that instrument, which was, in fact, done in 1899-1900 respecting the Wa country. The possibility of inducing Prince Ching to grant the line proposed as Frontier No. 1 can only be judged by His Majesty's Minister; but, if it is possible, it is the best solution of the question.
In any case, a frontier running criss-cross over the rivers and up and down the mountains, which Nature seems to have set as the natural frontier between two neighbours in this part of the world, would, I submit, be a great error. Besides, it would probably take years, great expense, and much fighting to delimit.
Another reason which Burma may reasonably give for declining to appoint a Boundary Commission on the same lines as in previous seasons is the treatment which the last of such Commissions received at the hands of the Yunnan Government. I do not wish to rake up old scandals unnecessarily, but I may recall that in the season of 1899-1900 the Chinese Commissioners, evidently under orders from Yunnan, put forward and obstinately maintained a gross forgery as the map which they alleged to have been signed by Lord Rosebery and Hsieh, Chinese Minister in London. The forgery was so clumsy that a well-known place like Thibaw was shown as far on the east of the Salween, and the map actually professed to lay down part of the French frontier. This map was concocted in Yunnan, and probably represented local ideas of what the frontier ought to be, quite apart from what the Treaty said it was to be; now, after the Hparé affair in February 1900, the Têngyüeh officials put forward a rough map of what they claimed as the frontier in the undelimited district, showing a line along the N'Maikha. Thus, we know that such a document as a Chinese map of part of the undelimited frontier does exist. I think it is a safe prophecy that if a Boundary Commission on the former lines is appointed, that document will be put forward by the Chinese Commissioners as the only authentic map of the frontier, quite irrespective of what the Treaty may have laid down, and that the labours of the Commission will therefore be foredoomed to failure if the Treaty and the Chinese map do not agree.
The Chinese claim at the very least to come over the range on the north-west of Ming Kwang Valley and down to the N'Maikha River; this claim, as the Têngyüeh officials have told me, is based on certain alleged rights of the Headman of Ming Kwang Valley, which is undoubtedly Chinese; but if, as I learn, the west slope of the range referred to is inhabited by Kachins, the control exercised over them by a petty Headman is likely to be very shadowy, and, indeed, such control is not admitted to exist by the Kachins concerned; on the other hand, so far as the exercise of the actual jurisdiction is concerned, Burma can, I suppose, put forward even less a priori claim to this tract, and her rights are based rather on geographical and ethnological grounds. Nor is it clear how far north the Ming Kwang Headman at present claims to go up the N'Maikha. On the east side of the range, on the east bank of that river, they do not go very far, nor at present beyond the headwaters of the Shweli; but if, as I am informed, the Ming Kwang men have salt wells on the Upper N'Maikha, they will probably claim to go a long way.
The difficulty respecting this strip of country between the N'Maikha and mountain range to the west of it is not merely the fact that the Ming Kwang Headman has claims, but that those claims will be strongly supported by the local officials and by the Têngyüeh gentry, who have a heavy interest in the opium-smuggling industry. It is safe to say that the great majority of the Chinese who pass the N'Maikha do so either to smuggle opium into Burma via the jade mines, or to meddle in Kachins' tribal disputes, which do not properly concern them. No matter what may be laid down in a Treaty, I doubt if any locally-appointed Chinese Commissioner would venture to assign this strip of territory to Burma in demarcation.
If my views meet with assent, I would venture to mention two possible means of compromise:
(1) The alleged rights of the Ming Kwang Headman along the banks of the N'Maikha might, if substantiated, be bought off by a rent or money payment, with the possible addition of concessions to Chinese views in the Wa country, which, I venture to assert, is of far less importance to us than this northern question. The Wa Hills are likely always to be a natural buffer, and such through trade as may grow up in this part of Yunnan will flow either north of the Wa Hills, past Kunlong, or south of them, by Meng Ma and Meng Lem. I am persuaded that in the future there may be important lines of communication between Assam and Burma on the one side, and Wei Hsi, Li Chiang, and Tibet on the other.
(2) The Chinese might be permitted to come down to the N'Maikha a little above N'Sentaru, follow up the river for a short distance, and the line might then be taken east, up one of the east tributaries of the N'Maikha, back on to the main Salween water-parting. The objections to what I have styled Frontier No. 2 would not be removed, but they would be greatly lessened by this expedient.
If the views now submitted do not meet with approval, and it is decided again to lay down a skeleton frontier in a Treaty to be demarcated on the spot by a Commission, I should wish to call attention to the following points:
(1) A good deal of difficulty has been caused in former cases by the Yunnan provincial authorities not having been sufficiently consulted in the Treaty negotiations: I would point out that a Consular officer of high rank is now to be stationed at Yunnan-fu, and would suggest that if negotiations cannot be wholly transferred to the provincial capital, that at least some preliminary arrangement should be come to between the Government of India, the Consul-General, and the Yünnan Viceroy before a Treaty is signed in Peking or London.
(2) I would avoid as far as possible the insertion in the Treaty of the names of Chinese districts or dependencies, i.e., if it is said that the boundary shall follow line A, giving State B to China, the limits of State B will promptly be extended by the imagination of the Chinese Commissioners far beyond the line A, and serious, perhaps unnecessary, difficulty be caused.
(3) I would, as far as possible, and save where positions have been accurately fixed, leave out latitudes and longitudes in the text of any Agreement which may be made. These mysterious figures, unknown to the orthodox classics, excite the utmost suspicion on the part of a Chinese official, and make him think that he is being cheated.
(4) The Chinese should be limited to one Commissioner, or at least to one with each party, if the Commission is divided into more than one section. To have two Chinese Commissioners more than doubles all difficulties and obstructions, as they are more occupied in trying to trip each other up than in attending to the business in hand. It must be remembered that the position of a Chinese Commissioner is a precarious one; I believe that after each season of the Burma-China Commission the officials so employed have been exposed to damaging accusations and impeachments by their enemies.
(5) Finally, I would submit that this question ought to be taken up as soon as possible. It will entail expense and probably the establishment of posts on the British side, but the longer it is delayed the heavier will be the cost, and the more difficult it will be to secure the interest of Burma. It might be supposed that as India is a very living, and China a very decaying, empire, we should have everything to gain by delay; but I am convinced that this is not the case.
The Chinese have been nearer to the debatable line than India for many years, and if the Chinese Government is decrepit, the Chinese people increase like rabbits, in Yunnan as elsewhere; while India has no surplusage of population pressing upon the frontier of the territory in question. Time will therefore ripen and strengthen the Chinese claims.
In view of the special difficulties surrounding this question, it may be thought advisable to get a complete map and more accurate information than is now possessed of the country which will have to be divided between India and China. In this connection, I think relations between Burma and Yunnan are now of a sufficiently satisfactory character to justify hopes of good results from a small joint survey expedition to be accompanied by a picked escort and only one or two officials of both Governments, who would have instructions to map and report upon a fixed portion of the country—to avoid, say, the strip between the N'Maikha and mountains to the east of it. To avoid misunderstandings with the Chinese, it would be necessary to issue clear instructions that the officers of the expedition had no authority to decide a boundary, but only to map and report.
If and when the Government of India considers that the time has come to take up this question, I would suggest that negotiations be commenced by a statement on the part of India addressed to the Peking Government per His Majesty's Minister, and to...
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likely to be able to fulfil her duty to her neighbour, if that duty is to keep in order a wide tract of country inhabited by wild tribes.
I would, therefore, suggest that it may be worth while to make a strong effort to sa ure the Salween-water parting (Frontier No. 1), I doubt if the Chinese Foreign Office knows or cares much about the frontier of Vannan, which it would be inclined to regard as a local question. The previous Treaty, as a glance at the text will show, seems to have been based almost wholly on information supplied by Burmah, and as the Chinese Boundary Commissioners are appointed locally, the idea seems to be that if the Provincial Government does not like the Treaty signed by the central authorities, it can give its Commissioners instructions at variance with that instrument, which was, in fact, done in 1899-1900 respecting the Wa country. The possibility of inducing Prince Ching to grant the line proposed as Frontier No. 1 can only be judged by His Majesty's Minister; but, if it is possible, it is the best solution of the question,
In any case, a frontier running criss-cross over the rivers and up and down to the mountains, which Nature seems to have set as the natural frontier between two neighbours in this part of the world, would, 1 submit, be a great error. Besides it would probably take years, great expense, and much fighting to delimit.
Another reason which Burmah may reasonably give for declining to appoint a Boundary Commission on the same lines as in previous seasons is the treatment which the last of such Commissions received at the hands of the Yunnan Government. I do not wish to rake up old scandals unnecessarily, but I may recall that in the season of 1899-1900 the Chinese Commissioners, evidently under orders from Yunnan, put forward and obstinately maintained a gross forgery as the map which they alleged to have been signed by Lord Rosebery and Hsieh, Chinese Minister in London. The forgery was so clumsy that a well-known place like Thibaw was shown as far on the east of the Salween, and the map actually professed to lay down part of the Freuch frontier. This map was concocted in Yunnan, and probably represented local ideas of what the frontier ought to be, quite apart from what the Treaty said it was to be; now, after the Hparé affair in February 1900, the Têngvuch officials put forward a rough map of what they claimed as the frontier in the undelimited district, showing a line along the N'Maikha. Thus, we know that such a document as a Chinese map of part of the undelimited frontier does exist. I think it is a safe prophecy that if a Boundary Commission on the former lines is appointed, that document will be put forward by the Chinese Commissioners as the only authentic map of the frontier, quite irrespective of what the Treaty may have laid down, and that the labours of the Co.- mission will therefore be foredoomed to failure if the Treaty and the Chinese map do not agree.
The Chinese claim at the very least to come over the range on the north-west of Ming Kwang Valley and down to the N'Maikha River; this claim, as the Têngyüsh officials have told me, is based on certain alleged rights of the Headman of Ming Kwang Valley, which is undoubtedly Chinese; but if, as I learn, the west slope of the range referred to is inhabited by Kachins, the control exercised over them by a petty Headman is likely to be very shadowy, and, indeed, such control is not admitted to exist by the Kachins concerned; on the other hand, so far as the exercise of the actual jurisdiction is concerned, Burmah can, I suppose, put forward even less a priori claim to this tract, and her rights are based rather on geographical and ethnological grounds. Nor is it clear how far north the Ming Kwang Headman at present claims to go up the N'Maikha. On the east side of the range, on the east bank of that river, they do not go very far, nor at present beyond the headwaters of the Shweli; but if, as I am informed, the Ming Kwang men have salt wells on the Upper N'Maikha, they will probably claim to go a long way.
The difficulty respecting this strip of country between the N'Maikha and mountain range to the west of it is not merely the fact that the Ming Kwang Headman has claims, but that those claims will be strongly supported by the local officials and by the Têngyuch gentry, who have a heavy interest in the opium-smuggling industry. It is safe to say that the great majority of the Chinese who pass the N'Maikha do so either to smuggle opium into Burmah via the jade mines, or to meddle in Kachins' tribal disputes, which do not properly concern them. No matter what may be laid down in a Treaty, I doubt if any locally-appointed Chinese Commissioner would venture to assign this strip of territory to Burmah in demarcation.
If my views meet with assent, I would venture to mention two possible means of compromise :-
(1) The alleged rights of the Ming Kwang Headman along the banks of the N'Maikha might, if substantiated, be bought off by a rent or money navment, with the
9
possible addition of concessions to Chinese views in the Wa country, which, I venture to assert, is of far less importance to us than this northern question. The Wa Hills are likely always to be a natural buffer, and such through trade as may grow up in this part of Yunnan will flow either north of the Wa Hills, past Kunlong, or south of them, by On the other hand, in spite of the difficulty of the country, Meng Ma and Meng Lem. I am persuaded that in the future there may be important lines of communication between Assam and Burmah on the one side, and Wei Hsi, Li Chiang, and Thibet ou the other.
(2.) The Chinese might be permitted to come down to the N'Maikha a little above N'Sentaru, follow up the river for a short distance, and the line might then be taken oast, up one of the east tributaries of the N'Maikla, back on to the main Salween water-parting. The objections to what I have styled Frontier No. 2 would not be removed, but they would be greatly lessened by this expedient.
If the views now submitted do not meet with approval, and it is decided again to lay down a skeleton frontier in a Treaty to be demarcated on the spot by a Commission, I should wish to call attention to the following points:
(1.) A good deal of difficulty has been caused in former cases by the Yunnan provincial authorities not having been sufficiently consulted in the Treaty negotiations: I would point out that a Consular officer of high rank is now to be stationed at Yunnan-fu, and would suggest that if negotiations cannot be wholly transferred to the provincial capital, that at least some preliminary arrangement should be come to between the Government of India, the Consul-General, and the Yünnan Viceroy before a Treaty is signed in Peking or London,
(2.) I would avoid as far as possible the insertion in the Treaty of the names of Chinese districts or dependencies, i.c., if it is said that the boundary shall follow line A. giving State B to China, the limits of State B will promptly be extended by the imagination of the Chinese Commissioners far beyond the line A, and serious, perhaps munecessary, difficulty be caused.
(3.) I would as far as possible, and, save where positions have been accurately fixed, leave out latitudes and longitudes in the text of any Agreement which may be made. These mysterious figures, unknown to the orthodox classics, excite the utmost suspicion on the part of a Chinese official, and make him think that he is being cheated. (4.) The Chinese should be limited to one Commissioner, or at least to one with each party, if the Commission is divided into more than one section. To have two Chinese Commissioners more than doubles all difficulties and obstructions, as they are more occupied in trying to trip each other up than in attending to the business in hand. It must be remembered that the position of a Chinese Commissioner is a precarious one; I believe that after each season of the Burmah-China Commission the officials so employed have been exposed to damaging accusations and impeachments by their and settled (5.) Finally, I would submit that this question ought to be taken as soon as possible. It will entail expense and probably the establishment of posts on the British side, but the longer it is delayed the heavier will be the cost, and the more difficult it will be to secure the interest of Burmah. It might be supposed that as India is a very living, and China a very decaying, empire, we should have everything The Chinese have to gain by delay; but I am convinced that this is not the case.
enemies.
up
been nearer to the debateable line than India for many years, and if the Chinese Govern- ment is decrepit, the Chinese people increase like rabbits, in Yunnan as elsewhere; while India has no surplusage of population pressing upon the frontier of the territory in question. Time will therefore ripen and strengthen the Chinese claims.
In view of the special difficulties surrounding this question, it may be thought advisable to get a complete map and more accurate information than is now possessed of the country which will have to be divided between India and China. In this con- nection I think relations between Burmah and Yunnan are now of a sufficiently satis- factory character to justify hopes of good results from a small joint survey expedition to be accompanied by a picked escort and only one or two officials of both Governments, who would have instructions to map and report upon a fixed portion of the country--
To avoid say the strip between the N'Maikha and mountains to the east of it. misunderstandings with the Chinese it would be necessary to issue clear instructions that the officers of the expedition had no authority to decide a boundary, but only to map and report.
If and when the Government of India considers that the time has come to take up this question, I would suggest that negotiations be commenced by a statement on the part of India addressed to the Peking Government per His Majesty's Minister, and to
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